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BOOK REVIEW
IN THE SLEEP ROOM by Anne Collins
Duff R. Waring*
There is a frightening discrepancy between what psychiatry aspires to
and what its more notorious practitioners have felt those aspirations
can sanction in the pursuit of a cure. Psychiatry aspires to alleviate
mental suffering through treating and ultimately curing mental illness.
When those aspirations take precedence over the human suffering they
are meant to address, the search for a cure can become a desperate
imperative to treat Anne Collins' book In the Sleep Room is about one
of those notorious practitioners for whom "the imperative to treat, aris-
ing out of the profession's impotence at curing, far outweighed the
basic ethical principle of primum non nocere - first of all, do no
harm."
Ewen Cameron's bizarre legacy does not typify the clinical practice of
contemporary psychiatrists. It does typify psychiatry's destructive
potential for inflicting great and desperhte cures on vulnerable
people.2 It also confirms that some very frightening things have been
done to mental patients in attempting to alleviate "disorders" that
engage our compassion but still largely confound our scientific under-
standing. The fact that these things were done to "help" people does
not make them any less strange or desperate. For his part, Ewen
Cameron sought nothing less than the holy grail of twentieth century
psychiatry: a somatic cure that worked.
Collins' book is also about the covert political network which so eager-
ly assimilated Cameron's furor therapeuticus. While much of this
material is derivative, it is concisely presented and affords the reader
an informative summary of the Cold War politicization of the be-
* Copyright 0 1989 Duff R. Waring. Duff R. Waring is a Patient's Advocate with
the Psychiatric Patient Advocate Office at Hamilton Psychiatric Hospital. The
views expressed herein are completely those of the author rather than the Patient
Advocate Office or Hamilton Psychiatric Hospital.
1. Anne Collins, In The Sleep Room: The Story of the CLI Brainwashing Experiments
in Canada (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys Ltd.,1988) at 70 [hereinafter
Collins]
2. Elliot S. Valenstein, Great and Desperate Cures: The Rise and Decline of
Psychosurgery and Other Radical Treatments for Mental illness (New York. Basic
Books, 1986).
Book Review
behavioural sciences.3 Ewen Cameron and the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) were made for each other, regardless of whether he
knew they were funding him.
Cameron was not an isolated figure in North American psychiatry. He
was "a mover and a shaker", a professional visionary on a grand scale.
He was head of the Allan Memorial Institute at McGill University in
Montreal from 1943 until 1964. During that time, he succeeded in cre-
ating, from scratch, a world class psychiatric training, research and
acute care institute. He served as president of both the Canadian and
American Psychiatric Associations and was one of the principal
founders of the World Psychiatric Association. He was a central figure
in the promotion and funding of psychiatric research in Canada and
was one of the four American psychiatrists who assessed Rudolph
Hess' fitness to stand trial at Nuremberg. His publications were
numerous although of marginal clinical value. His talent as a writer
lay in his ability to proselytize psychiatry's importance to a progressive
society. Cameron saw the mental health movement as a means to
"persuade the powers that be that the modem world required some
personality engineering."4
Despite his administrative and oratorial prominence, he lacked the
distinction of being a therapeutically creative ps$,chiatrist. No scientific
laurels "would crown his brow unless he made a great research break-
through."5 Consequently, Cameron strove to fashion a treatment for
schizophrenia that was both psychosomatic and "undeniably useful, as
insulin was to diabetes. ' 6 Utility was everything to Cameron and he
was prepared to use "anything-in the book or out of it-that might give
him results."7 His radical treatment was composed of two elements
which he called "psychic driving" and "depatteming".
Psychic driving revolved around Cameron's personal belief in the
power of repetition. Tape recorded statements obtained from inter-
3. Much of this research is documented elsewhere. The definitive book is John
Marks' The Search for the "Manchurian Candidate'" CIA and Mind Control (New
York. Dell Publishing, 1979) [hereinafter Marks]. Marks examines the Cold War
politicization of the behavioural sciences in impeccable detail. The book is the
result of extensive research into declassified CIA files.
4. Collins, supra, note I at 96.
5. Ibid. at 119.
6. Ibid. at 120.
7. Ibid. at 120.
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views were played back to the patient in an attempt to inculcate
desired attitudes or changes in behaviour. If the patients did not come
up with a significant insight on their own, then Cameron would splice
the tapes and produce one. "The trouble with the patients who
weren't undergoing (psychic) driving in concert with sleep therapy was
that when all other forms of resistance failed they tended simply to get
up and leave the room, and sometimes the institute."8 Cameron's
method for preventing this counter-therapeutic response was to medi-
cate his patients three times a day with a "sleep cocktail." 9 By 1953 he
was keeping patients in a chemically induced sleep for thirty to sixty
days while he attempted to literally drive the message into their minds.
The tape loop was broadcast up to sixteen hours a day from a speaker
on the wall of the sleep room or under the patient's pillow. Patients
were bombarded with "negative" statements designed to get rid of
unwanted behaviour for several weeks before being switched to two to
five weeks of "positive" statements designed to induce desirable
behaviour. Patients were regularly roused for linen changes and those
who were too sedated were fed intravenously.
Cameron's next step was to make his patients more receptive to the
message through "adjuvant" drugs or sensory isolation. He was quite
comfortable with dosing unsuspecting (and unsupervised) patients
with lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). One female patient was placed
in a sensory isolation box for thirty-five days.10 The idea was to better
prepare her for the one hundred days of positive psychic driving that
followed. 11 Cameron had nothing to support the efficacy of this treat-
ment beyond his own hunch that he saw "definite if short-lived
changes" in the personalities of some of his patients.12 He persisted in
his belief that greater behavioural changes could be effected if the rep-
etitions "were increased twelve to sixteen hours a day, and up to half a
million times." 13
8. Collins, supra, note I at 128.
9. Ibid. at 160. It consisted of 100 rags of Nembutal, 100 mgs of Seconal, 150 rags
of Veronal or Sodium Amytal, 50 rags of Chlorpomazine or 100 rogs of Proma-
zine, and/or 50 rags of Phenergan.
10. Ibid. at 129. Cf Marks, supra, note 3 at 147.
11. Marks, ibid.
12. Collins, supra, note 1 at 127.
13. Ibid. at 130.
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When Cameron noticed that there was no evidence to support this
belief, he speculated that there was some kind of "switcher
mechanism" in the brain which prevented adaptive responses. He con-
cluded that the only way to overcome this hypothetical mechanism
was to completely obviate the patient's old behaviour patterns, to "dis-
organize them so entirely that they had no defence against the new
patterns [he] wanted to implant ' 14 If the patient's mind was an origi-
nally blank slate coloured in by limiting and damaging experiences,
then Cameron would wipe the slate clean and re-colour it with posi-
tive ones. He called this element "depatterning", or the breakdown of
both normal and schizophrenic behaviour patterns by means of inten-
sive electroshocks and prolonged, drug-induced sleep.15
Cameron further speculated that if he could induce "complete
amnesia", the patient would eventually recover much of his/her nor-
mal, as opposed to schizophrenic, behaviour patterns. At no time in
his career did he offer any clinical evidence to support this idea. His
use of ECT was extreme by the standards of his own time when
patients were allegedly given a single dose of 110 volts lasting a frac-
tion of a second, once a day or every other day.16
"By contrast, Cameron used a form 20 to 40 times more intense,
two or three times daily, with the power turned up to 150 volts.
Named the 'Page-Russell' method after its British originators, this'
technique featured an initial one second shock, which caused a
major convulsion, and then five to nine additional shocks in the
middle of the primary and follow-on convulsions."17
"'wo months of this treatment left patients incontinent in both
bladder and bowel and without any sense of space, time or per-
sonal identity. Whatever else it did for people, it certainly got close
to producing a blank slate for Cameron to write on."18
Cameron publicized his treatment in the national press in 1955 as
"beneficial, Canadian-style brainwashing" that was analogous to the
political sort in which people broke down under "cold, hunger, isola-
14. Collins, supra, note 1 at 130.
15. Ibid. at 131-32. Cf. Marks, supra, note 3 at 144.
16. Marks, ibid. at 143.
17. Ibid. at 143. Cf. Collins, supra, note I at 131-32.
18. Collins, ibid.
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tion, fear and increasing indoctrination." 19 This theme was further
developed in an article published in the American Journal of Psychiatry
in 1956: psychic driving and depatterning were similar in effect to the
"breakdown of the individual under continuous interrogation." 20 Fifty-
three of his patients received complete amnesia depatterning at the
Allan Memorial Institute in 1958 and 1959 alone.21 Cameron used the
treatment from 1953 to 1963. Several other doctors at the Allan
depatterned some of their own patients under Cameron's general
supervision.22 By 1963, Cameron himself admitted that his treatment
did not work.3 Collins provides a useful if derivative summary of the
clandestine political network which eagerly funded Cameron's work.
During the early fifties, the American intelligence establishment was
alarmed at the idea that a "mind control gap" existed in favour of the
Communist Bloc. The Communists supposedly had developed an
effective means of "brainwashing" their political prisoners. Western
intelligence agencies soon had clear evidence that the Communists
had not invented a new scientific technique to control men's minds.
The mere possibility that they might invent one was enough to initiate
one of the most bizarre Cold War objectives on record: the develop-
ment of an American mind control program.24 The next move was to
persuade behavioural scientists to pursue the "mind control end in an
officially undeclared war."2 The conscription campaign was extensive.
The intelligence establishment, especially the CIA, "changed the face
of the scientific community during the 1950's and early 1960's by its
interest [in research that was relevant to developing chemical or other
means of mind controll. 26 Everything from mind altering drugs to
sensory isolation and hypnotism was deemed relevant. "Nearly every
scientist on the frontiers of brain research found men from the secret
19. Collins, supra, note 1 at 135.
20. Ibid. at 130.
21. Marks, supra, note 3 at 144.
22. Collins, supra, note 1 at 198.
23. Ibid. at 189.
24. Ibid. at 44-63. Cf. Marks, supra, note 3 at 23-26 and 133-39.
25. Collins, ibid. at 55.
26. Marks, supra, note 3 at 151.
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agencies looking over his shoulders, impinging on the research.127
Many of these scientists knowingly worked for the CIA or the Ameri-
can military during the twenty-five year course of the project. Others
worked for research organizations or funding agencies which were
actually CIA "fronts". Cameron was one of the latter.
The CIA and military scientists experimented on people who were "if
not expendable, at least not particularly prized as human beings."28
Captured spies, prison inmates, prostitutes and psychiatric patients
were an excellent source of data.29
The CIA wanted to perform "terminal experiments" that "would be
carried through to completion. It would not end when the subject felt
like going home or when he or his best interest was about to be
harmed. Indeed, the subject usually had no idea that he had even
been part of an experiment." 30Terminal experiments were meant to
transcend conventional ethical and legal limits although CIA sources
have stated that experiments causing death were forbidden.31 Death by
experimental misadventure was a risk to be assumed. 32
Cameron was the perfect CIA foil: not only was he willing to perform
experiments in sensory deprivation, mind altering drugs and behavi-
our patterning, but he also had his own source of subjects. He was an
excellent "terminal researcher" because he was willing to push his
patients far beyond their own good for his own - and the agency's -
experimental ends.33 By attempting to wipe the minds of his patients
clean and then trying to reprogram them with new behaviour and
thought patterns, "Cameron carried the process of 'brainwashing' to its
logical extreme."'34
The CIA funded Cameron's research from 1957 until 1960. His grants
were stamped with a specific rider that he was to be kept unaware of
27. Marks, supra, note 3 at 151.
28. Ibid. at 34.
29. Ibid. at 34; 66-68: 101-104.
30. Ibid. at 35.
31. Ibid. at 35.
32. Ibid. at 72.
33. Collins, supra, note 1 at 139.
34. Marks, supra, note 3 at 150.
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its involvement and Collins points out that the CIA did not shape the
direction of his research but kept his work under close supervision.35
There is no evidence that Cameron knew the source of his CIA fund-
ing.
Collins is a masterful story teller and has proportionately developed
the political and historical subtexts of Cameron's career into an illu-
minating format Her presentation of the victims is somewhat selective
but is compassionately drawn without melodrama. The reader acquires
a strong sense of how deeply some of them believed in Cameron. For
some, he was their last and only hope. Others were depatterened so
quickly and effectively that it took them years to figure out what had
been done to them. It was not until the publication of Mark's research
in 1977 that many of the victims began to piece the story together.
Most of Cameron's depatterned patients claimed to be left with mas-
sive memory deficits and learning disabilities which in some cases
made them virtual strangers to themselves and their families.36
Collins' account of the victims' suit against the CIA was written before
all nine plaintiffs agreed to a lump sum settlement of $750,000.00 last
year. Her portrayal of their United States' lawyer Joseph Rauh is espe-
cially interesting: the line between a committed legal advocate and an
emotional confrontation artist can be thin indeed. Rauh's "righteous
indignation" may have inspired some purple prose in his letters to
Prime Minister Mulroney but the Canadian government's minimal
interest in the victims is both disturbing and predictable. The fact that
the CIA secretly funded research in Canada for its own political ends
did not upset the Mulroney government even though it was under-
stood during the 1950's and 1960's that neither government would fund
classified or even declassified defence research in the other country
without permission, or at the very least, disclosure.3 7 This indicates a
patronizing deference to U.S. authority that most Canadian officials
passed off as acceptable protocol. Canada sought to avoid an active
role in making the CIA accountable to the victims in court and
wanted to distance itself from any legal or moral responsibility for
what had been done to them. Hence the Cooper Report, which Rauh
35. Collins, supra, note I at 139. Cf. Marks, supra, note 3 at 150
36. Collins, ibid. at 216-17.
37. Ibid. at 218-19.
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described as one of the "shabbiest, most mean-spirited and error-rid-
den official documents ever produced by a government following
Anglo-Saxon legal principles of fairness and due process of law ".... 38
Lacking public and political support, the case was widely perceived as
being relevant only to those on the fringes of society.
"Few people who haven't been in mental hospitals find ex-inmates
a credible source of comment on anything - even their own experi-
ences in mental hospitals.... Nobody except the fringe-dwellers
pays attention to the fringes."39
Collins only tentatively addresses the issue of how such barbaric prac-
tices could be therapeutically sanctioned by the psychiatric profession.
The usual response runs through the Cooper Report like a complacent
refrain: Cameron's work was not scientifically nor ethically improper
given the standards of the day. The line between routine and experi-
mental treatment was less clear than it is now. The [supposedly] strict
regulatory guidelines governing experimental treatments and the
expanded requirements for obtaining informed consent have only
become formalized and entrenched over the past twenty years.
The fact that hindsight offers easy solutions need not prevent one
from taking issue with this response. Ethical standards covering medi-
cal experimentation were in place during Cameron's career. The
Nuremberg Code's first provision on voluntary, informed consent was
supposed to apply to all doctors, not just those employed in Nazi
death camps.4 Medical professional bodies and health organizations
38. Collins, supra, note I at 230. Halifax lawyer George Cooper was appointed in
1985 by Justice Minister Crosbie to study the issue of the Canadian
government's possible liability in the case. Cooper concluded that it bore no
legal or moral responsibility because Cameron's grant applications were sub-
jected to official scrutiny and peer review and no objections were made to those
in charge of allocating the funds. Cooper concluded, per Lord Denning, that
"we must not condemn as negligence that which is only a misadventure."
Despite this conclusion, Cooper suggested an ex gratia settlement of SI 00,000 for
each of the nine plaintiffs. External Affairs Minister Clark eventually recog-
nized their need for financial assistance and awarded them $20,000 each. See
Collins at 234-35. See also the complete Cooper Report, infra, note 45.
39. Ibid. at 4.
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promulgated their own versions of the Code. By the 1950's the Ameri-
can Medical Association's legal advisors were stating that blanket con-
sent forms for even standard treatments were insufficient: "patients
had to consent to the specific treatment or operation."41 According to
an affidavit on the development of medical ethics by Columbia Uni-
versity professor David J. Rothman filed by the nine plaintiffs in the
CIA suit, "a requirement for voluntary [informed] consent was widely
recognized in an uncodified form by the medical community before
the Nuremberg trials and ... this requirement was fonly] formalized in
the Nuremberg Code."42
Widely recognized, perhaps, but not widely relied upon by doctors
who could profess to having their patients' best interests at heart.43
These standards were clearly not inhibiting to the CIA. Short of the
intentional infliction of death, there are few indications that the CIA
took them seriously enough to put definitive ethical brakes on its use
of "terminal researchers" and the development of psychological means
of offence, regardless of the United States' government's 1953 claim to
the contrary.44
40. This provision is quoted by Collins supra, note 1 at 111-112 and reads as fol-
lows:
"The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This
means that the person involved should have the legal capacity to give consent;
should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the
intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching or
other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowl-
edge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to
enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter ele-
ment requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the
experimental subject there should be made known to him the nature, duration,
and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be con-
ducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected and the
effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from the experi-
menL"
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests
upon each individual who initiates, directs, or engages in the experiment. It is a
personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to another with
impunity."
41. Ibid. at 112.
42. Ibid. at 253-54.
43. Ibid. at 112-113.
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To state that few formal, in-hospital regulations were in place for
ensuring compliance with these standards is probably correct, but it
does not negate the standards themselves. They were apparently not
perceived as being relevant to most psychiatrists who were ostensibly
trying to help their patients, let alone one of Ewen Cameron's emi-
nence. As one psychiatrist pointed out in his submission to the Cooper
Report: "Medical paternalism was still prevailing" during Cameron's
career and "the ethics of an experimental procedure were very much
left to the judgement and conscience of the researcher ...."45 The
assumption of this benign paternalism was also shared by the general
public in its long standing deference to medical authority. Cameron's
talk of "beneficial brainwashing" in the national press did not, to my
knowledge, provoke a public outcry or calls from concerned citizens
for an investigation.
It is difficult to accept the contention that it may not have been clear
that Cameron's combination of psychic driving, depatterning, sensory
isolation and psychoactive drugs was not experimental. This combined
treatment mode originated with Cameron and to my knowledge was
exclusively conducted at the Allan under his general aegis. It was not a
routine treatment of the times for anyone but .Cameron and perhaps
some of his associates.... It is specious to state that his treatments
were then regarded as "heroic if extreme attempts to help patients who
were suffering and were not receiving benefits from conventional
treatments" that were not experimental46
Cameron's work did not escape the criticism of some of his own emi-
nent contemporaries although no one went public with them.47 Most
of the criticism was expressed privately between concerned psychia-
trists. We might conclude that they did not feel comfortable coming
forward because to them, Cameron was the profession. Those who
may have thought otherwise knew that at the very least, he was the
Allan Memorial Institute.48 The treatments were stopped shortly after
Cameron's retirement by his successor, Dr. Robert Cleghorn. He later
45. Opinion of George Cooper Q.C., Regarding Canadian Government Funding of the
Allan Memorial Institute in the 1950s and 1960s (Canada: Minister of Supply and
Services, 1986), Appendix 4 at 10.
46. Ibid. Appendix 6 at 7.
47. Ibid. at 75-86.
48. Collins, supra, note 1 at 198.
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wrote that Cameron's treatments amounted to "therapy gone wild with
scant criteria."49
Collins has written a compulsively readable book that will make a
strong impression on even the most jaded reader. Her reportorial writ-
ing style adds much human colour to a story that is based on the lives
and careers of real people. Ewen Cameron's career will always be
stranger than fiction.
In The Sleep Room is a grim reminder that the ethics of experimental
treatment should not be left to the sole discretion of the researcher or
selected professional contemporaries. The personal values, ethics and
conscience of the physician are valued as necessary elements in the
treatment process, but they are insufficient safeguards by themselves.
Until we demystify our reliance on medical paternalism, our belief in
the professional ethics of informed consent will be based on trust that
is unsupported by legally sanctioned, independent scrutiny.
49. Collins, supra note 1 at 197.
